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In countries where health care is publicly provided and where equity considerations play an 
important role in policy decisions, it is often argued that an increase in co-payments is 
unacceptable as it will be particularly harmful to the less well-off in society. The present 
paper derives socially optimal co-payments in a simple model of health care where people 
differ in income and in severity of illness. The social optimum depends on the welfare 
weights given to persons with different levels of expected utility. Increased concern for equity 
may increase optimal co-payments for illnesses with homogeneous severity across the 
population. For illnesses where the severity varies strongly across the population, optimal co-
payments go down as a response to increased concern for equity, provided income differences 
in the society are sufficiently small. 
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From the insurance literature it is well known that positive co-payments
have two e⁄ects1: On the one hand they reduce social e¢ ciency by reducing
the risk sharing properties of insurance. On the other hand positive co-
payments increase social e¢ ciency by reducing moral hazard. One important
type of moral hazard for health care is that if the price the patient pays for
some treatment is zero or low, the patient will purchase treatment even if
the willingness to pay for the treatment is considerably lower than the cost
of providing treatment. The optimal size of co-payments balances the two
considerations above, see e.g. Zeckhauser (1970), Ma and Riordan (2002).
In countries where health care is publicly provided and where equity con-
siderations play an important role in policy decisions, it is often argued that
an increase in co-payments is unacceptable as it will be particularly harmful
to the less well o⁄ in the society. The present paper gives a critical discus-
sion of this issue. Within a simple model of health care where people di⁄er
in income and in severity of illness, it is shown in section 2 who gains and
who loses from an increase in the co-payment for a particular treatment.
The socially optimal co-payment is then derived by maximizing the sum of a
concave transformation of expected utility for each person (section 3). The
concave transformation re￿ ects equity considerations, giving a person lower
weight in the social welfare function the better o⁄ this person is in terms of
expected utility. In section 4 it is shown how more concern for equity ("more
concavity") a⁄ects the optimal co-payment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Co-payment, taxation, and individual wel-
fare
The welfare of a person is given by u(y ￿ t) if healthy, where t is a tax per
person (same for everyone, see below) and y is income net of any taxation
other than t. The function u is the same for everyone, while y varies among
1See e.g. Arrow (1963, 1968), Pauly (1968), Shavell (1979).
2the population. For each person there is a probability ￿ (same for everyone)
that the person becomes ill. In this case the welfare level of the person is
u(y ￿ t) ￿ ‘ if untreated, where ‘ may vary among persons. The illness can
be completely cured by a treatment that costs c (same for all treatments).2
The price that a patient must pay for this treatment is p 2 [0;c].
If a person becomes ill he or she will choose treatment if and only if
u(y ￿ t ￿ p) ￿ u(y ￿ t) ￿ ‘ (1)
Obviously, a person with ‘ > 0 will choose to be treated if p is zero or
su¢ ciently close to zero, no matter how low y is. For higher values of p,
some or even all persons may choose not to be treated. A person is more
likely to choose treatment the higher are y and ‘ and the lower is p. It is
useful to denote the set of people who choose treatment by ￿(p), i.e.
￿(p) = fy;‘ j u(y ￿ t ￿ p) ￿ u(y ￿ t) ￿ ‘g (2)
The set ￿(p) obviously depends on how y and ‘ are distributed in the popu-
lation. We assume that the joint distribution function is F(y;‘); and without
loss of generality we assume that all values of y and ‘ in the population are
in the range [0,1].3
Denoting the expected utility of a person by v(y;‘;p), we have
v(y;‘;p) = (1 ￿ ￿)u(y ￿ t) + ￿ max[u(y ￿ t) ￿ ‘;u(y ￿ t ￿ p)] (3)
The size of the co-payment will a⁄ect the revenue requirement of the
government. There are two reasons for this. First, the higher is the co-
payment, the lower is the cost paid by the government per treatment. Second,
the higher is the co-payment, the fewer persons will choose to be treated. We
shall assume that any change in the government￿ s revenue requirement is met
by a corresponding change in the tax rate t that is the same for everyone. In
2The assumptions of a separable utility function and that the illness can be completely
cured simplify the formal analysis, but are not essential for the main results.
3Formally, we assume F(y;0) = F(0;‘) = 0 8 (y;‘) 2 [0;1] and F(1;1) = 1:
3Section 5 we give a discussion of this assumption and of the consequences of
relaxing it.
Denoting the share of the population that is treated by !(p); the relation-
ship between the size of the co-payment and the tax rate t and is formally
given by
t(p) = ￿ ￿ (c ￿ p) ￿ !(p) (4)
It follows that
t
0(p) = ￿￿!(p) + ￿ ￿ (c ￿ p) ￿ !
0(p) (5)
which is negative since !0(p) is negative.
If p is su¢ ciently small, everyone will choose treatment provided ‘ > 0
for everyone. In other words, !(p) = 1 and !0(p) = 0 for su¢ ciently low
values of p. For su¢ ciently high values of p; some people will choose not to
be treated, i.e. !(p) < 1: From (4) and (5) it therefore follows that
￿t0 (p) = ￿ for p so small that !(p) = 1
￿t0 (p) < ￿ for p su¢ ciently close to c
(6)
For intermediate values of p, we may very well have ￿t0 (p) > 1, since there
is nothing that rules out "large" values of ￿!0:
We are now ready to see how the expected utility v(y;‘;p) of a particular
person depends on the size of the co-payment. To see this, we distinguish
between those who choose treatment and those who don￿ t: For those who





0(y ￿ t) > 0 (7)
For these persons (which include those with ￿low￿income if p initially is large
enough), an increase in co-payments is thus unambiguously desirable. The
interpretation is obvious: Since these persons in any case are choosing not to
be treated, they are not directly a⁄ected by the increase in the co-payment.
4However, they gain from the tax reduction that is implied by the increase in
the co-payment.
For those who choose to be treated, it follows from (3) that
@v(y;‘;p)
@p
= (1 ￿ ￿)[￿t
0(p)]u
0(y ￿ t) + ￿[￿t
0(p) ￿ 1]u
0(y ￿ t ￿ p) (8)
In this expression, the ￿rst term is positive. We cannot unambiguously sign
the second term without knowing more about t(p) than t0(p) < 0. However,
the concavity of u implies that u0(y ￿ t) < u0(y ￿ t ￿ p) when p is positive.





0(y ￿ t ￿ p) (9)
From (6) it follows that the LHS of (9) is negative for p su¢ ciently close to
0, and for p su¢ ciently close to c. From (7) and (9) we therefore have the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the initial co-payment is su¢ ciently low, everyone chooses
to be treated, and a small increase in the co-payment will make everyone
worse o⁄. If the initial co-payment is su¢ ciently close to the treatment cost
and some people choose to be untreated at this co-payment, those who have
chosen not to be treated gain from an increase in the co-payment, while those
who have chosen to be treated lose from an increase in the co-payment.
Figure 1 illustrates how v will depend on the size of the co-payment for
a typical person. If p is so low that everyone chooses treatment (below p0 in
Figure 1), it follows from (6) that (8) can be rewritten as
@v(y;‘;p)
@p
= (1 ￿ ￿)￿[u0(y ￿ t) ￿ u0(y ￿ t ￿ p)] < 0
if !(p) = 1
(10)
where the inequality sign follows from the concavity of u. A positive co-
payment can thus only be optimal if it is set so high that it makes some
persons choose not to be treated.
5Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of the size of the co-paymant
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As p increases beyond p0, more and more persons choose not to be
treated. The person illustrated by Figure 1 chooses treatment provided the
co-payment does not exceed p1. For p > p1 expected utility is increasing in
p, cf. (7). In Figure 1, v is strictly concave for p 2 (p0;p1). Generally, this
need not be the case. And even if v is strictly concave for p 2 (p0;p1) with
a local maximum at p￿, it is not obvious which of the three values v (y;‘;0),
v (y;‘;p￿) and v (y;‘;c) is highest.
3 Co-payment and social welfare
The objective of the government is to maximize the sum of welfare for all
persons. However, for a government concerned about equity it is not reason-
able to assume that this sum is unweighted. If the government cares about
equity, it is reasonable to assume that persons with low expected utility have
a higher weight in the sum of welfare than persons with high expected util-
6ity. In the hypothetical case of the government being perfectly informed
about everyone￿ s income earning abilities and health characteristics (‘ in the
present analysis), lump-sum taxation could be used to obtain whatever dis-
tributional objectives the government had. In this case everyone would have
the same welfare weight (on the margin) after the lump-sum taxation had
been applied. In practice the government does not have perfect information
about individuals￿earning abilities and health characteristics. Distributional
considerations must therefore be achieved through distortionary taxation.
In this case it is not optimal to redistribute so much that marginal welfare
weights are equalized across the population.
To capture distributional considerations, we assume that the government
maximizes the sum over all persons of a concave transformation of expected
utilities, i.e. over ￿(v(y;‘;p)) where is ￿ is increasing and concave. The





This expression can be illustrated by a Figure similar to Figure 1. In
particular, since p0 is the same for everyone, we typically get a local minimum
at p0 or somewhere to the right. The value p1 varies among persons, so the
aggregate curve will not have a kink at p1 as in Figure 1. However, we may
very well have at least one non-concave section of the curve for aggregate
welfare in addition to the area near p0. It is clear from Figure 1 that even if
we ￿nd a local optimum with a positive co-payment, this optimum must be
compared with the case of no co-payment and possibly also with other local
optima with positive co-payments.
From now on we only consider the case of an interior optimum, i.e. the
optimal p is in the interval (0,c). Di⁄erentiating (11) with respect to p and
using (7) and (8) gives the following ￿rst-order condition for the socially





















0(y ￿ t ￿ p)dF(y;‘) = 0 (12)
The two ￿rst terms in this expression are are positive, implying that the
last term is negative, i.e. we must have 1 + t0(p) > 0 at the optimal value
of p. We shall use the expression above to answer the question what is the
e⁄ect on the optimal co-payment of an increase in the concern for equity?
4 Co-payments and equity concerns
Consider a change in the function ￿(v) in the direction of stronger prefer-
ences for equity, i.e. a "more concave" function. More precisely, let ￿(v)
be replaced by ￿￿(v) ￿ f(￿(v)) where f0 > 0 and f00 < 0: Calling ￿0(v)
and ￿￿0(v) the "marginal welfare weights" before and after the change, the
change in marginal welfare weights is given by ￿(v) = ￿￿0(v) ￿ ￿0(v): Since
the level of the function f0 is of no importance, it is convenient to chose this
level so that Z Z
(y;‘)2[0;1]
￿(v(y;‘;p))u
0(y ￿ t)dF(y;‘) = 0 (13)
It is easy to verify that the de￿nition of the function ￿(v) implies that
￿
0(v) < 0 at the value of v giving ￿(v) = 0: Denoting this value of v by v￿ it
therefore follows from (13) that ￿(v) > 0 for v < v￿ and ￿(v) < 0 for v > v￿.
In words, marginal welfare weights increase for persons with "low" expected
utility (v < v￿) and decline for persons with "high" expected utility (v > v￿).
The normalization given by (13) implies that the ￿rst of the three terms
in (12) does not change as the function ￿(v) changes. The total change in












0(y ￿ t ￿ p)dF(y;‘) (14)
If we can sign ￿; we also know how the optimal co-payment p changes as
a response to the change in the function ￿(v): If ￿ is positive (negative) the
LHS of (12) becomes positive (negative) when ￿(v) is replaced by ￿￿(v): To
restore equality, it therefore follows from the second order condition that p
must increase (decline).
It is not possible to unambiguously sign ￿ for the general case. It is
therefore useful to consider the special cases in which the heterogeneity in
the population is in either preferences or income, but not both.
4.1 Heterogeneous preferences
In this special case we assume that the income y is the same for everyone, but
that the values of ‘ varies in the population. Expected utility of a person
therefore only depends on this person￿ s value of ‘: A person with a value
of ‘ above u(y ￿ t) ￿ u(y ￿ t ￿ p); henceforth denoted L; will choose to be
treated (cf. the discussion of equation (1) in Section 2), giving this person an
expected utility equal to (1￿￿)u(y￿t)+￿u(y￿t￿p): A person with a value
of ‘ below L will choose not to be treated, giving this person an expected
utility equal to (1￿￿)u(y ￿t)+￿[u(y ￿t)￿‘]; which is higher the lower is
‘: The relationship between v and ‘ is illustrated in Figure 2.
Restricting ourselves to the case where the function ￿(v) is continuous,
the critical value ‘￿ corresponding to v￿ must lie below L; i.e. all of the
persons choosing to be treated and some of the persons choosing not to be
treated must get a higher marginal welfare weight as a consequence of the
increased concern for equity (see Figure 2). For this case we can rewrite (14)
as
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￿ [1 + t
0(p)]u










￿(v)dF(y;‘) < 0 (16)
since ￿(v) > 0 for ‘ > L: The ￿rst integral in (15) is in other words negative.
The second integral in (15) is positive, since ￿(v) > 0 for ‘ > L: Since the
terms [￿t0(p)] and [1 + t0(p)] are both positive, it follows that ￿ < 0 in the
present case. From our previous discussion we thus have the the following
proposition:
10Proposition 2 Assume that incomes are identical in the population but pref-
erences, represented by the variable ‘; di⁄er among persons. Assume also
that the initial optimal co-payment is such that some persons choose treat-
ment while others choose not to be treated. In this case increased concern for
equity reduces the optimal co-payment.
4.2 Heterogeneous income
In this special case we assume that the value of ‘ is the same for everyone, but
that income y varies in the population. Expected utility of a person therefore
only depends on this person￿ s income. A person with a "high" income (a value
of y satisfying the inequality (1)) will choose to be treated, and a person with
a "low" income (a value of y that does not satisfy the inequality (1)) will
choose not to be treated. Expected utility v will in this case be a strictly
increasing function function of y; and the value of y corresponding to v￿ is
denoted by y￿: For this case ￿(v) > 0 for y < y￿ and ￿(v) < 0 for y > y￿. In
words, marginal welfare weights are increased for persons with "low" income
(y < y￿) and reduced for persons with "high" income (y > y￿).
Use Y to denote the critical value of y giving equality in (1). The expres-












0(y ￿ t ￿ p)dF(y;‘) (17)
Just like for the general case, it is not possible to unambiguously sign ￿
for this special case. However, there exist changes in the function ￿ that
make ￿ unambiguously positive. Consider ￿rst the case where all of those
who initially are treated get a lower marginal welfare weight after the change.
In other words, ￿(v) < 0 for y > Y: In this case the second integral in (17) is
negative. In the ￿rst integral there are negative and positive values of ￿(v):
11However, since ￿(v)u0(y￿t) is lower the higher is y; it follows from (13) that
the positive values dominate, i.e. that the ￿rst integral in (17) is positive.
Since the terms [￿t0(p)] and [1+t0(p)] are both positive, it follows that ￿ > 0
in this case.
The case in which ￿(v) < 0 for all who initially choose to be treated is
obviously rather restrictive. However, even if some of those who choose to
be treated get increased marginal welfare weights, the negative ￿-terms in
the second integral may dominate the positive ￿-terms, so that the second
integral remains negative. And even if so many of those treated get increased
marginal welfare weights that the second integral becomes positive, ￿ may
still be positive since the ￿rst term in (17) is always positive. This leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume that the value of ‘ is the same for everyone, but
that income y varies among persons. Assume also that the initial optimal
co-payment is such that some persons choose treatment while others choose
not to be treated. In this case increased concern for equity increases the op-
timal co-payment provided a su¢ ciently large number of persons who choose
treatment get reduced marginal welfare weights.
5 Interaction with a progressive tax system
So far, we have only considered tax changes that were identical for everyone.
This assumption may be justi￿ed as follows: Distributional considerations
are achieved through distortionary taxation. The optimal design of a distor-
tionary tax system implies that redistribution has been taken to the point
where the social gain from further redistribution is exactly o⁄set by the in-
cremental distortion of higher rates of taxation. For an optimally designed
tax system of this type, social welfare cannot be increased by increasing or
reducing a tax component which is equal for all (and thus non-distortionary)
and adjusting the distortionary part of the tax system so that total revenue
is unchanged. On the margin, it therefore makes no di⁄erence whether an
12increase in health expenditures is ￿nanced by a non-distortionary tax in-
crease (i.e. a tax increase that is the same for everyone) or by an increase in
distortionary tax rates. The assumption that any change in the co-payment
is balanced by a change in the tax rate t that is the same for everyone is
therefore less restrictive than it may immediately seem.
From the reasoning above it follows that as we vary the size of the co-
payment p, the change in social welfare (as measured by (11)) is independent
of whether the variation in p is matched by a change in t or some other tax
component in the tax system, as long as the tax system initially is optimally
designed. However, since a change in p normally will change all components
of an optimally designed tax system, the change in expected utility for any
particular person will be di⁄erent from what we derived in Section 2. In
particular, equations (7) and (8) and Proposition 1 will no longer be valid.
The ￿rst-order condition (12) for the optimal p is valid also when all
components of the tax system are optimally set. However, as the income
term y is gross income minus all taxes other than the tax component t,
this income term will in this case depend on these other taxes as well as
on the distribution of gross income. When social preferences become more
equity oriented, it is reasonable to assume that the optimal tax system will
be changed, implying a change in y for any given level of gross income. The
e⁄ect of this change in the distribution of y is not taken into consideration
in our analysis in Section 4.
The case considered in Section 4.1 will not be a⁄ected by the assump-
tion that the tax system is optimally designed, since incomes in any case are
identical in this case. Proposition 2 thus remains valid. For the case consid-
ered in 4.1 on the other hand, the derivations and results will generally be
changed if the change in social preferences also changes the distribution of
y. The main result hover, that the optimal co-payment might increase as a
response to increased concern for equity, remains valid. To see this, consider
the case where the distortionary costs of a progressive element of the tax sys-
tem increase sharply once this progressive element reaches some threshold.
If we are at this threshold before preferences are changes, increased concern
for equity will only give a very small increase in this progressive element of
13the tax system. The change in the distribution of y will therefore be very
small, implying that the derivations in Section 4.1 remain almost the same
as for the case where the progressive element of the tax system was assumed
to be constant.
Even if the progressive element of a tax system increases signi￿cantly a
response to increased concern for equity, the optimal co-payment may also
increase. To see this, consider the following simple example. There are three
groups in society: "Rich and very healthy", "poor and quite healthy" and
"poor and weak". The "rich" never get ill, while the income and probability
of illness is the same for two "poor" groups. For the "quite healthy", the
utility loss in case of illness is much smaller for than the treatment cost, while
the opposite is true for the "weak". In such an economy it will be socially
optimal to give the "weak" treatment in the event of illness, while treatment
for the "quite healthy" is ine¢ cient. The co-payment should therefore be set
so high that the "quite healthy" choose to go untreated in the case of illness.
Given this constraint, the co-payment should be set as low as possible, in
order to achieve income smoothing across states for the "weak".
Now consider an increased concern for equity. The tax system would then
change so that the "rich" get lower income and both "poor" groups get higher
income. Since the "quite healthy poor" now will get an increased willingness
to pay for treatment, they will choose treatment if the co-payment is held
constant at its original level. In order to prevent this socially ine¢ cient
outcome, the co-payment must be increased so much that the "quite healthy
poor" continue to choose to go untreated, in spite of their increased income.
In the Appendix we give an alternative fully speci￿ed numerical example
with a linear tax function where both the marginal tax rate and the co-
payment increase as a response to increased concern for equity.
6 Concluding remarks
In the Introduction, we argued that concern for equity is often used as an
argument against any proposal of increasing co-payments for health treat-
ment. By this logic, we would expect that increased concern for equity, as
14de￿ned precisely in Section 4, should make optimal co-payments go down.
We have shown that this need not be the case. On the contrary: With
homogeneous preferences, Proposition 3 suggests that it is quite likely that
optimal co-payments increase with more concern for equity.
When preferences for health care vary across people, it is not obvious
in what direction optimal co-payments change when society￿ s concern for
equity increases. Proposition 2 suggests that in a country where income
di⁄erences are small, optimal co-payments should be lower the stronger is
society￿ s concern for equity, at least for treatments for which preferences are
rather heterogeneous.
We have used the term ￿preferences￿and ￿severity of illness￿interchange-
able throughout the paper to describe the variable ‘. This has been deliber-
ate: The way the model is set up, it seems natural to think of ‘ is a measure
of the severity of an illness (if untreated). On the other hand, one can simply
interpret ‘ as a parameter in (a special case of) a utility function where ag-
gregate consumption (y) and health care (￿‘) enter, and where health care
is only valued positively if one has some illness. In such a setting the value of
the parameter ‘ will simply represent the willingness to pay for a treatment
should one require it to avoid a speci￿c illness. Also at the more practical
side, one can interpret the variable ‘ di⁄erently. Consider for instance the
case of prescription medicines. Some prescription medicines are good exam-
ples of a large heterogeneity in the population regarding the bene￿ts of the
medicine. In many cases a new and more costly medicine will have the same
primary medical e⁄ect as a medicine already in use. However, the new medi-
cine may have weaker unpleasant side e⁄ects. Such side e⁄ects very often
vary strongly among di⁄erent patients, being non-existent or weak for some,
and very severe for others. In this case it is natural to regard the variable ‘
as a measure of severity of an illness. A di⁄erent example is a couple who can
only have children through assisted fertilization. The term ‘ is in this case a
variable re￿ ecting how much worse of the couple feels without children than
with, i.e. a variable measuring the strength of the preferences for having
children.
The degree of heterogeneity of preferences in a society is likely to vary
15a lot between di⁄erent types of illnesses. Although the formal model used
in the present analysis only considers one type of illness, Propositions 2 and
3 suggest the following result: If a society becomes more concerned about
equity, it may be optimal to reduce co-payments for some types of treatments
but at the same time increase co-payments for other treatments.
16Appendix: A numerical example
Consider an economy where the average gross income is 1. There are two
equally sized groups. Group 1 has income 1.5, while group 2 has income 0.5.
The probability of illness is 0.1, and the treatment cost is 1. The utility loss
in case of illness for group 1 is so large that treatment is chosen no matter
how high the co-payment is, while there is no utility loss for group 2.
There are two tax parameters: The tax t that is equal for everyone, and
a proportional income tax ￿. There is a deadweight loss associated with ￿,
implying that the tax function (4) now becomes





The term in square brackets is the income revenue (per capita) due to the
proportional tax (since average income is 1). The last term (￿2) represents
the deadweight loss due to the distortion implied by the income tax. This
distortion implies that the top of the "La⁄er curve" for this tax component
is at ￿ = 0:5.
Net incomes for the two groups are (using (18))4
y1 = 1:5 ￿ 1:5￿ ￿ t = 1:450 ￿ 0:5￿ ￿ ￿
2 + 0:05p (19)
and
y2 = 0:5 ￿ 0:5￿ ￿ t = 0:450 + 0:5￿ ￿ ￿
2 + 0:05p (20)
Notice that whatever p is, y1 declines and y2 rises as ￿ increases, as long
as ￿ < 0:25: However, for ￿ > 0:25 both net incomes decline as ￿ increases.
In a social optimum it therefore must be the case that ￿ < 0:25:
The utility function is u(x) = lnx for both groups. Expected utility levels
for the two groups are
v1 = 0:9ln
￿









4Notice that we have subtracted also the constant tax t in this de￿nition of net income,








It is easily veri￿ed that v1 > v2 for all ￿ 2 [0;0:25] and p 2 [0;1]: In
the social welfare function group 2 should therefore be given at least as large
weight as group 1. Since there are only two groups, it is easier to work with
exogenous welfare weights than the concave function used in Sections 3-4.
The social welfare function is thus
W = v1 + ￿v2 (23)
where ￿ ￿ 1.






















￿ (0:5 ￿ 2￿)
y2
= 0
for p 2 [0;1], ￿ 2 [0;0:25], given ￿. A numerical solution for the optimizing
problem for di⁄erent values of ￿ is found using Maple (s.t. ￿ 2 [0;0:25] and
p 2 [0;1]):
￿ p W
￿ = 1 .1062872413 .6703546385 -.3575958178
￿ = 1:5 .1357928137 .8486112171 -.6707438076
￿ = 1:75 .1455947627 .9067929325 -.8227024058
From this table it is clear that as the concern for equity (measured by
￿) increases, we get an increase in both the optimal marginal tax and the
optimal co-payment.
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